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Psychiatry And The Denial Of Evil:
Defining Misbehavior as Brain Disease
Thomas Szasz*
The view that mental illnesses--exemplified by schizophrenia--
are bona fide brain diseases is now the doctrinal tenet of biological
psychiatry. According to the authoritative Diseases of the Nervous
System--Clinical Neurobiology, "the conclusion that schizophrenia
is a bona fide organic brain disorder is now incontrovertible."1
Logically, this perspective on mental illness ought to have
liquidated psychiatry as a medical specialty and replaced it with an
expanded neurology. Instead, it liquidated the remains of a
marriage of convenience between Kraepelinian psychiatry and
Freudian psychoanalysis and, under the slogan "remedicalization,"
expanded psychiatry into a neurobiology of behavior without
identifiable boundaries. The conquest of misbehavior by biological
psychiatry is epitomized by the widespread adoption--by
government agencies, courts, insurance companies, and so forth--
of the various versions of the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals, and by the virtually obligatory
use of drugs in the psychiatric treatment of mental patients.
The fact remains, however, that of all the medical specialists,
only psychiatrists posit a causal connection between disease qua
bad organ and symptom bad behavior. For example, John W.
Hinckley, Jr. shoots the President, and the observers--psychiatrists,
journalists, jurists, and jurors--conclude that he has a
malfunctioning brain. Lest this seem a caricature, consider the
following vignette from the official publication of the New York
* M.D., Professor, Upstate Medical Center, State University of New York, Syracuse, New
York.
1. 2 L A. Grebb et al., Schizophrenia, in DisEAsEs OF THE NERVous SYSTEM - CLINIcAL
NEuRoBIOLorY 839 (A. K. Asbury et al. eds., 1992).
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State Office of Mental Health:
Maine Lyttle's brother has a mental illness .... It is difficult to talk
about [sic]. I have never been able to find a comfort zone for talking
openly to those outside of the movement [the Alliance for the Mentally
III] ... . The way I look at it, he is one of the most unfortunate
individuals. He suffers from paranoid schizophrenia... during a very
psychotic episode, 17 years ago--at a time when there was little or no
treatment available to him in the community--he caused a terrible
tragedy. It ended in the loss of life to two people he was very close to
.. he suffers from a no-fault neurobiological disorder.
2
Making this diagnosis is not motivated by "Maine Lyttle's" interest
in the truth about her brother's brain; instead, it is driven by her
interest in denying her brother's responsibility for his misbehavior
and, along with it, her own shame for having such an embarrassing
brother.3
It is an integral part of our contemporary, scientific world view
that we regard the human body as a complex biological machine,
composed of various parts, each exhibiting specific functions. For
example, the heart pumps blood, the lung absorbs oxygen and gives
off carbon dioxide, the kidney secretes urine, and so forth. In short,
our organs have, so to speak, "naturally" (biologically) given
"purposes" (functions). Hence, except for a few marginal cases,
there is world-wide, cross-cultural consensus about what constitutes
the proper functioning of the heart or the kidney.
Let us now add together all the organs, tissues, and cells of the
human body and consider the ensemble as a whole. Considered
biologically, we call this entity the "human organism;" considered
morally and socially, we called it--or, more correctly, him or
her--a "person." What is this ensemble for? What is its purpose?
The purpose of the organism may be said to keep itself alive,
preferably long enough to reproduce the species. But what is the
purpose of the person? Confronted with this question, we can no
2. A Sister Speaks Out, OMH NEws, Mar. 1992, at 6, 13.
3. Thomas S. Szasz, Diagnoses are Not Diseases, 338 THE LANcEr 1574, 1574-76
(December 21/28 1991).
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longer fall back on biology for an answer. The person, as distinct
from the organism, is a moral-social construct.4 Hence, its function
or purpose must be framed in moral (religious) and social (cultural)
terms. Herein lies the crux- of the confusion between disease and
(nis)behavior: Whereas the function of the liver, lungs, or brain is
cross-culturally invariant, the function of the person, shaped by
culture, is necessarily cross-culturally diverse.
From ancient times until the Enlightenment and beyond,
religion defined the purpose of the human being qua person: It was
to worship God and live life according to His word as revealed to
His prophets (Abraham, Jesus, and Mohammed), and set forth in
Holy Scripture (the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the
Koran). The Enlightenment, science, and the separation of church
and state undermined the authority of this answer to the question:
What is Man (good) for? The problem now became not that God
was dead, as we have so often been told, but rather that Man was
alive. The individual awoke from his long theological slumber and
realized that he had not the faintest idea of what to do with
himself. More than ever, man now wanted to feel that his life had
meaning, that he was a good person. Hence, man sought the
approval, and avoided the disapproval, of his fellows. As a result,
modem man lives, in part, in the shadow of the reflected
distinction and disgrace of his personal associates, especially his
kinfolk and countrymen. The triumph of an athlete thus becomes
the source of national pride, while the dramatic misdeed of a
malefactor becomes the source of collective guilt or at least a blot
on the good name of the family. Millions of people sit in front of
television sets to watch their countrymen kick or toss a ball and
derive great pride from their ability to do it better than their foreign
competitors. Mutatis mutandis, people feel intense shame for the
misdeeds of those with whom they associate, the closer the
association, the more intense the mortification. By attributing good
deeds to the free-willed behavior of good persons, and bad deeds
to the morally indifferent effects of "no-fault" brain diseases,
psychiatric explanations and interventions protect people from the
4. See generally G. H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SoCIETY (1934).
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embarrassment, humiliation, and disgrace they would otherwise feel
for the evil actions of their kin and countrymen.
To sum up, a diagnosis of bodily illness is made by observing
the subject's body, whereas a diagnosis of mental illness is made
by observing his behavior. This explains why diagnoses of mental
illnesses, but not bodily illnesses, are routinely made by policemen,
politicians, journalists, television commentators, and people in all
walks of life, and why courts entrust making such diagnoses to
juries. After all, today everyone knows that only a mentally ill
person--suffering from a "no-fault" brain disease--threatens to kill
himself, assaults his relatives, or shoots the President.
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